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his issue of EAP begins our 17th year. We thank 
the 73 readers who have renewed their sub-
scriptions and include reminders for “delinquents.” 
 We include two feature essays this issue, the 
first of which, by philosopher Dylan Trigg, explores 
the relationship between memory and place, using 
the coffee-house chain Starbucks as a context for 
discussion. Second, psychologist Chris Aanstoos 
examines phenomenologically the process of de-
signing his own “dream house” in a Georgia forest. 
These two essays—one conceptual and phi-
losophical, the other experiential and grounded in 
firsthand will and need—illustrate the wide range of 
phenomenological perspectives and methods. 
 
Phenomenology Conferences 
The annual meetings of the Society for Phenome-
nology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) and the 
Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sci-
ences (SPHS) will be held 12-15 October 2006 in 
Philadelphia. The meetings are sponsored by Villa-
nova University. www.spep.org. In conjunction with 
SPEP and HPHS, the annual meeting of the Inter-
national Association for Environmental Philoso-
phy (IAEP) will be held 14-16 October. Contact: 
scameron@lmu.edu. 
IAEP Session on “Nature of Order” 
During the 2005 business meeting at last year’s 
IAEP conference in Salt Lake City, officers pro-
posed that IAEP (see above), in conjunction with 
other “environmental” groups, would co-sponsor 
paper sessions all day Monday, 16 October. 
 Representing EAP, David Seamon and Cana-
dian graduate student Tim Quick have agreed to or-
ganize a double session on architect Christopher 
Alexander’s four-volume The Nature of Order, 
which we have highlighted regularly in EAP. Pres-
entation topics may focus on any aspect of Order, 
whether more conceptual and philosophical or more 
design-oriented and related to architectural practice. 
If any EAP readers would like to present a pa-
per in these special sessions, please contact David 
Seamon as soon as possible: triad@ksu.edu. 
 
 
Below: Drawings from Stephen A. Mouzon’s Tradi-
tional Construction Patterns, a book that identifies cen-
tral elements that make good traditional architecture—
“patterns,” as Mouzon calls them (see p. 4). 
These drawings refer to Mouzon’s first pattern, 
simplicity of massing: “The root of nearly all traditional 
architectural massing is simplicity. Go back to the build-
ings that are the foundation of almost any style, and you 
will find a simple volume or an assembly of 
simple volumes.” 
 
In regard to the two houses shown 
here, Mouzon says: “Don’t use complicated 
forms…. [Instead], keep massing simple. 
Composing a house of one or a few simple 
boxes saves tremendous amounts of money 
for more effective things like proper porch 
detailing, back porches, garden walls, front-
age fences, [and] pergolas…that help the 









We are grateful to the following readers who have 
contributed more than the base subscription for 
2006. As always, we could not continue without 
your generous support, and we thank you all! 
 
David Adams   Tom Barrie 
Alfred Bay    Margaret Boschetti 
Carol Cantrell   Linda Carson   
Clare Cooper Marcus  Ryan Drum 
Tom Erickson   L. J. Evenden 
Kirk Gastinger   Marie Gee 
Rich Haydn    Michael Kazanjan 
David Kermani   Patricia Locke  
Karen Kho    Ted Lowitz   
Anne Niemiec   Claudia Mausner  
Susan Mazur-Stommen Robert Mugerauer  
Miles Richardson   Leanne Rivlin   
Douglas Patterson  Kim Rollings   
Mark Rosenbaum  Hanalei Rozen   
Tom Saarinen   Peter Sauer   
Silke Schilling   Gwendolyn Scott  
Harvey Sherman   John Sherry, Jr.   
Eva Simms    Charlene Spretnak  
Karen Steinmayer  Karen Vitulano   
Sandra Vitzthum   Justin Winkler 
 
Items of Interest 
The 25th annual International Human Sciences 
conference will be held 3-6 August 2006 at the 
John F. Kennedy University in Pleasant Hills, Cali-
fornia. The conference theme is “The Multicultural 
Future of Qualitative Research,” though all proposal 
topics will be considered. 
The theme description reads in part: “An inher-
ent problem of research in the human sciences is 
understanding human beings with their infinite 
complexity and diversity in ways that can somehow 
yield knowledge that is to some degree generaliz-
able without being reductionistic. This challenge of 
honoring diversity while also organizing around 
some necessary commonality is an increasingly im-
portant issue in most, if not all, societies.” 
This group has continued to be interested in 
environmental and architectural aspects of human 
life, and EAP readers are encouraged to participate. 
Paper abstracts are due 1 March and should be 
submitted to conference organizer Barbro Giorgi at 
bgiorgi@jfku.edu. For the current IHS newsletter, 
go to: www.seattleu.edu/artsci/psychology/ihsr-05.htm. 
 
The 24th annual symposium of the Simon 
Silverman Phenomenology Center will focus on 
“Paul Ricoeur and Phenomenology” and be held 17-
18 March at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh. 
Keynote speakers include Mory Joy, David Pel-
lauer, Lenore Langsdorf, and Peter Kemp. Contact: 
Dan Martino, Director, Simon Silverman Phenome-
nology Center, at: martino@duq.edu.. 
 
The conference, “Senses of Place: Exploring Con-
cepts and Expressions of Place through Different 
Senses and Lenses,” will be held in Hobart, Tas-
mania, 6-8 April 2006 and is co-sponsored by the 
University of Hobart’s Place Research Network.  
www.utas.edu.au/placenet/senses. 
 
The conference Writing on the Land: John 
Burroughs and His Legacy, will be held 11-15 
June 2006 at the State University of New York at 
Oneonta. The focus is on nature writers who, like 
Catskill regionalist John Burroughs, are linked 
closely to a particular landscape or place. Topics 
of interest include: regional novelists, literary en-
vironmentalists, and sense of place in literature. 
Abstracts are due by March 30. Contact Prof. 
Daniel Payne at: paynedg@oneonta.edu. 
The Nature Institute will sponsor programs and 
seminars on Goethean science this spring and 
summer, including a full-time immersion course, 2 
April-June 16. www.natureinstitute.org. 
 
News from Readers 
Sean M. Conrey is currently a Ph.D candidate in 
rhetoric and composition at Purdue University. He 
is working on a dissertation entitled “Coming to 
Terms with Place: A Phenomenological Tech-
nique of Rhetorical Placemaking.” This work de-
monstrates how “coming to terms” with the places 
in which we live is a crucial aspect of settling into 
place. Conrey seeks to derive a rhetorical tech-
nique for helping this “coming to terms” happen. 
conreys@purdue.edu. 
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Writer and artist Christine Rhone sends the follow-
ing from London: “The House of Commons was 
the setting for the recent presentation of a prestig-
ious Green Apple Environment Award to Earth-
dome, a residential development in the London sub-
urb of Norbury and the first to have geothermal hot 
water and heating. Earthdome is a set of four apart-
ments in two new semi-detached houses, located in 
a street of similar houses designed in the 1930s.  
“The street has a comfortable feeling about it, 
relaxed and leafy. Earthdome is different from the 
other houses in the street, but it does not jar. A cas-
ual passerby might not even notice anything special 
about it. Yes, here the windows are bigger than in 
the other houses, but not so much that they call at-
tention to themselves. Here the decorative tiles on 
the façade are almost the same, only slightly rear-
ranged to accord with the proportions of the Golden 
Section of sacred geometry. Here the rendering of 
the exterior looks rather similar, but it is mixed with 
volcanic ash and minerals, and for more than practi-
cal reasons. The volcanic elements symbolize the 
father covering and protecting the mother and 
home. 
“Earthdome features geothermal heating, which 
is the most energy efficient, environmentally clean 
and cost-effective. Heat is moved from 40 feet be-
low the Earth’s surface into the building through a 
system of pipes and pumps.  
“All hot water is heated geothermally. Bathtubs 
are encased in resins blended with quartz crystal. 
Sinks and toilets are covered with a subtle silver 
glaze, enhancing the properties of water. All skirting 
and most angles are rounded. Cornices help modu-
late the sound properties of spaces. Staircases spiral 
up and down in a series of recyclable units. French 
doors open wide for easy changes of air. 
“Floors are covered with porcelain tiles con-
taining quartz. Rugs soften under footsteps rather 
than dust-clinging carpets. Electrical wiring is 
shielded. Much of the lighting has on-off sensors 
for energy efficiency. The whole electrical field 
around beds can be completely switched off for 
sounder sleep. And up in the topmost bedrooms, 
blue floor lighting suggests a mood of peace, while 
the skylights give views of the horizon and the 
clouds. 
“A homecoming is a return from chaos to cos-
mos, a recognition and an embrace of the center of a 
universe. Here home is imagined as the metaphori-
cal product of the fertilizing male volcano and the 
fruitful female earth. The center of a home is the 
hearth, as circle of fire or point of flame. A signifi-
cant shift in orientation occurs in Earthdome, since 
the notional hearth, as central source of ambient 
warmth and cooking heat, is in the crust of the Earth 
itself.  
“Sometimes it takes only a small shift to reori-
ent one’s whole relationship to home and through 
home to the universe. From the outside, to the cas-
ual passerby on the street, Earthdome looks good, 
but it does not shout, “Hey, look at me, I’m really 
different!” It is, quite simply, the house next door to 
a boyhood home, but radically transformed from the 
inside out—something like a man coming back 




Francis Violich, professor emeritus in city and re-
gional planning and in landscape architecture at the 
University of California, Berkeley, died 21 August 
2005, of natural causes at his home in Berkeley. He 
was 94.  
Since EAP was founded in 1990, Violich was 
one of its staunchest supporters (see his “Dalmatia, 
Urban Identity and the War, 1991—1993,” in the 
fall 1993 issue). We will miss his encouragement, 
networking, and creative insights in recognizing the 
considerable contribution that phenomenological 
understanding can offer urban place making. 
Memorial contributions can be made to the 
Francis Violich Dalmatian Fellowship Fund. c/o UC 
Berkeley's Department of City and Regional Plan-
ning, 228 Wurster Hall, Berkeley, Calif. 94720. 
 
Citations Received 
Chris Allen, 2004. Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology 
and the Body-in-Space: Encounters of Visually Im-
paired Children, Environment and Planning D: So-
ciety and Space, 22: 719-35. 
 
This sociologist develops “a phenomenology of visually im-
paired childrens’ everyday body-in-space encounters with 
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their home and urban environments.” A major focus is “the 
various and creative ways in which visually impaired children 
routinely exercise agency within their home and urban envi-
ronments.” 
 
Bruce V. Foltz & Robert Frodeman, eds., 2004. Re-
thinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philoso-
phy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
This collection of articles “brings the voices of leading Conti-
nental philosophers into discussion about what is emerging as 
one of our most pressing and timely concerns—the environ-
mental crisis facing our planet.” Contributors include David 
Abram, Robert Mugerauer, and Ingrid Leman Stefanovic. 
 
Trish Glazebrook, 2003. Art or Nature: Aristotle, 
Restoration Ecology, and Flowforms, Ethics & the 
Environment, 8, (1): 1-36. 
 
Using the example of sculptor John Wilkes’ flowforms, this 
philosopher argues that “ecologically-minded art can demon-
strate how production of artifacts need not affirm a logic of 
domination, but rather can open a space for an alternative con-
ception of the human relation to nature.” 
 
Tom Mels, ed., 2004. Reanimating Places: A Geog-
raphy of Rhythms. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
 
Dedicated to geographer Anne Buttimer, this collection of 14 
articles focuses on the links among lived experience, time, 
space, and place. Editor Mels provides an introduction on  the 
“Lineages of a Geography of Rhythm,” and contributors in-
clude: Yi-Fu Tuan (“Sense of Place: Its Relationship to Self 
and Time”); David Ley (“The Stranger’s Lifeworld”); Edward 
Relph (“Temporality and the Rhythms of Sustainable Land-
scapes”); Gunnar Olsson (Placing the Holy”); Robert Sack 
(“Place-Making and Time”); and David Seamon (“Grasping 
the Dynamism of Urban Place: Contributions from the Work 
of Christopher Alexander, Bill Hillier, and Daniel Kemmis”). 
 
Joy Monice Malnar & Frank Vodvarka, 2004. Sen-
sory Design. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
These authors argue that “a better understanding and apprecia-
tion of all our senses can contribute to a new typology for the 
design of significant spaces, one that would sharply contrast 
with the formal model that dominates architectural practice 
today.” The result is said to be “a new philosophy of design 
that celebrates our sensuous occupation of the built environ-
ment and creates more humane design.” 
Stephen Mouzon, 2005. Traditional Construction 
Patterns. NY: McGraw-Hill. 
 
This architect “explains, in layman’s terms, the vague sense of 
unease we’ve all had with traditional architecture done incor-
rectly… and provides the tools for doing it right again.” Mou-
zon’s main tool is a set of 108 “patterns” illustrated as Do’s 
and Don’t’s, for example, “simplicity of massing” (no. 1) 
which argues that a building should be shaped as “a simple 
volume or an assembly of simple volumes”; or “symmetry of 
the face” (no. 4), which says that “all traditional architecture 
reflects the bilateral symmetry of the human face in some way 
at the entry of the building.” Includes drawings and well-
chosen photographs; see the examples on p. 1. 
 
Juhani Pallasmaa, 2005. Encounters: Architectural 
Essays. Helsinki: Rakennustieto. 
 
Twenty-five reprinted articles and book chapters all broadly 
on “the phenomenology of architecture and architectural ex-
perience,” written over the last 25 years by Finnish architect 
and architectural writer Juhani Pallasmaa. Includes such im-
portant essays as “Stairways of the Mind,” “Identity, Intimacy, 
and Domicile,” “Hapticity and Time,” and “The Rooms of 
Memory: Architecture in Painting.” Includes a 2004 interview 
with Pallasmaa, conducted by architect Peter MacKeith. A 
central text for “architectural phenomenology.” 
 
Christopher J. Preston, 2003. Grounding Knowl-
edge: Environmental Philosophy, Epistemology, and 
Place Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press. 
 
This philosopher argues that “the physical realities of the envi-
ronments in which beliefs are formed are relevant to the ways 
people know.” He seeks to demonstrate that “the very cogni-
tive processes with which we contemplate our place in the 
world are themselves derived from and wedded to our physical 
locatedness. This claim entails that part of the feeling of at-
tachment to place is quite literally an attachment of a portion 
of our cognitive architecture to the lands we inhabit.” 
 
Nikos A. Salingoaros, 2004. Anti-Architecture and 
Deconstruction. Germany: Umbau-Verlag. 
 
A scathing, often “over-the-top,” attack of deconstructivist 
architecture, and thoughts about design alternatives, mostly 
focused on the work of Christopher Alexander. Many useful 
ideas but marred by a frequent mean-spiritedness that inter-
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Trigg is a research student at the University of Sussex. He is interested in marginal spaces such as hotel lobbies, 
airports and supermarkets. He has also written on the aesthetics of decay and modern ruins. His current research 
explores the idea of the built environment as a testimony to events of past destruction. His essay here is part of a 
broader work that examines the role that homogenous ‘sites’ play in contributing to a memory-based theory of 
personal identity. © 2006 Dylan Trigg. www.dylantrigg.com; dylantrigg@hotmail.com. 
 
 
ow does space contain memories? The 
question is hampered in that we lack a cri-
terion that enables us to ascertain where 
past memories end and unmediated experience be-
gins. Pure experience eludes as the imagination cre-
ates spatial memories devoid of factual grounding. 
Despite this apparent conflation between forms 
of recollection, remembering an event necessarily 
implicates the context in which that memory took 
place. A placeless memory, as Edward Casey 
(1987a pp. 183-84) notes, not only disallows mem-
ory to be situated accurately; it also prevents disori-
entation with regard to that memory. 
Casey’s analysis of ‘place memory’ is insightful 
and contentious. As with Gaston Bachelard, memo-
rable space presupposes being intimate. This is a 
claim that allows Casey to render place “congealed 
scenes” for memory. As such, fulfilling Aristotle’s 
original description of place as “the innermost mo-
tionless boundary of what contains,” Casey (p. 184) 
is able to posit an idea of place as a place-holder of 
memories, so securing spatial memories. 
In the present essay, I wish to contest Casey’s 
analysis of place memory. While intimate place is 
often regarded as archetypal in its containment of 
memory, the radical dichotomy between place and 
non-place (principally in the form of ‘site’) means 
that any such ambiguity between the two has been 
neglected. Here, I wish to address this neglect and 
in the process posit the memorable power of site. 
 
***** 
e can begin by examining how Casey 
grounds his account of place memory. In this 
way, an opening is provided to ascertain if spatial 
memories are as secure as originally thought. Echo-
ing Bachelard’s, Casey’s account of memory is 
framed by a mistrust of temporal-centrism. Under-
standing time without reference to what is repre-
sented by time means there is no contrast against 
which the measure of passing can be established. 
“It is,” Casey writes in relation to the body, 
“only when we notice discrepancies between such 
states that we begin to infer the passage of time…” 
(p. 182). The simple ‘pastness’ of memory fails to 
acknowledge its entirety. Casey’s reply to this in-
completeness is to consider how embodied memory 
necessarily involves particularization:  
 
To be embodied is ipso facto to assume a particular perspec-
tive and position... it is to occupy a portion of space from out 
of which we undergo given experiences and remember them. 
To be disembodied is not only to be deprived of place, un-
placed; it is to be denied the basic stance on which every ex-
perience and its memory depend (ibid.).  
 
This is an important passage that grounds Ca-
sey’s account. Memory necessarily individuates 
events from other events by being specific. Thus, 
recollection suspends other events selectively to al-
low a particular memory to transpire. 
The specificity of this recollection means that 
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vague as to evade a set of defined circumstances. 
But this is not the case: even the most formless 
memories submit to the category of being specific, 
and an event which is specific necessarily defines 
itself in time and space: “As embodied existence 
opens onto place; indeed takes place in place and 
nowhere else, so our memory of what we experi-
ence in place is likewise place-specific” (p. 182). 
The ‘nowhere else’ of Casey’s remark reaffirms 
the exclusive nature of memory and experience. 
Freud’s comment that “the same space cannot have 
two different contents” is repeated in Casey’s meta-
physics of spatial memory where the particulariza-
tion of memory instigates its unique embodiment.  
 
***** 
nfortunately for Casey, history has lost sight of 
the way that place contains our memories. 
Methods for remembrance have deviated from the 
Greek art of memory. The implications for this are 
more than a mere loss of tradition. In addition to 
being subjugated by a concentration on time, place 
has also been shadowed by a preoccupation with 
what Casey terms ‘site’: “that is, place as leveled 
down to metrically determinate dimensions” (p. 
182). This division between place and site is essen-
tial, not least in relation to memory-based theories 
of personal identity. As such, it warrants careful ex-
amination. 
Much has changed,” writes Casey with some re-
gret, “since the early Pythagorean Archytas declared 
that place is ‘the first of all beings, since everything 
that exists is in a place and cannot exist without a 
place’” (p. 184). 
Casey’s historical reading of place’s loss of em-
placement is framed by a geometrization of space 
and place that occurred during the 17th century. 
Situating Greek thought against modern thought 
(Newtown, Descartes, and Bernoulli), Casey sug-
gests that geometrical space “was conceived as con-
tinuous extension in length, breadth, and width and, 
thus, as mappable by the three-dimensional coordi-
nate system of rational geometry” (ibid.). As a result 
of this transition, place loses its “inhomogeneous 
and anisotropic qualities” and instead “is conceived 
as sheer spatial site” (p. 185). 
Site, for Casey, is thus open. Against Aristotle’s 
definition of place as “the innermost motionless 
boundary of what contains” (ibid.), the relationship 
between a site and what occupies that site is de-
tached, abstract and entirely devoid of intimacy. The 
effects of this are that as a container of memories, 
site falters. The “essentially empty” quality of the 
site undermines any claim to being memorable: “A 
site possesses no points of attachment onto which to 
hang our memories, much less to retrieve them” (p. 
184). 
In contrast, place, “full of protuberant features 
and forceful vectors” (p. 186), is distinct and able to 
facilitate memorability. Through containing memo-
ries, place preserves them: “To be in a place is to be 
sheltered and sustained by its containing boundary; 
it is to be held within this boundary rather than to be 
dispersed by an expanding horizon of time or to be 
exposed indifferently in space” (ibid.).  
 
***** 
ith the risk of dispersion present, we have 
been united with Bachelard. Indeed, at stake 
in both Casey and Bachelard are several assump-
tions that both bind and ground their theories simul-
taneously. Though phrased differently in Bachelard, 
the distinction between site and place is elemental 
for both thinkers. 
In both cases, we observe a masterful working 
of space and place in which intimacy and protection 
are essential in the construction of memorable 
place. Whereas Casey opposes place and site, 
Bachelard forges a radical (and dialectical) distinc-
tion between inside and outside through which the 
universe is said to press down upon the interiority 
of the home. 
For Casey, site has a negative quality in that in-
difference, emptiness, and outright geometrization 
suppress the power of place. In Bachelardian terms, 
such attributes contribute to the dispersion of the 
potential dweller. Bachelard (1964, p. 47) writes: “A 
house that has been experienced is not an inert box. 
Inhabited space transcends geometrical space.” The 
alignment of geometrical space with Casey’s site 
affirms the lack of shelter between the two. Both 
expand so that memories disperse as the absence of 
place neglects to contain them. 
Let us summarize: through lacking “variega-
tions,” site offers no possibility of containing 
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or otherwise—means that nothing in particular 
stands out. Indeed, site is only transformed into a 
place through the conferment of a distinctive thing 
upon it, such as a house (1987a, p. 186). The pres-
ence of a house carves particularity from the ho-
mogenous and undefined. This is what we mean by 
the term ‘intimacy’. Lived experience, so important 
to both Casey and Bachelard, remedies the vacuity 
of the site by enforcing a narrative upon it. 
In turn, place becomes animated through be-
coming particular. A particular place has a discern-
able identity. Thus, the trust we have in the continu-
ous familiarity of a place means that indifference 
gives way to idiosyncrasy and character. Indeed, 
character and intimacy, if not synonymous with one 
another, remain inextricably bound. 
We now must examine Casey’s argument criti-
cally. In the first instance, intimate space is said to 
be conducive to the emplacement of memory, since 
intimacy distinguishes itself from the supposed ho-
mogeneity of the site. Yet, this simple dichotomy 
between the place that contains and the site that dis-
perses precludes an ambiguity between the two. 
Indeed, in a later essay, Casey goes so far as to 
describe site rather self-consciously as the “anti-
place dancing on the abyss of no-place” (1997, pp. 
267-96). Thus, that site itself might afford a sense of 
intimacy is not possible in accordance with Bache-
lard and Casey’s logic.  
 
***** 
ut what if one considers the role that site plays 
in securing intimacy rather than undermining 
it? It is often said that certain places are all the 
same. One of the unashamedly non-distinguishing 
features of a place (if the term can be used in an in-
formal sense) like Starbucks is that it remains the 
same despite its spatial location. Orientation and 
continuity are afforded in a foreign city by knowing 
what qualities imbue the coffee house in advance. 
Against the backdrop of unfamiliarity, familiarity is 
conceived as the indissoluble motifs and identical 
pastel colors of Starbucks are encountered. 
In such a situation, we can pretend to be any-
where while simultaneously being somewhere. So 
long as the outside remains excluded, Starbucks as-
pires to universality in its interior spatiality. 
Avoiding an indeterminate idiosyncrasy that 
would harbor a discontinuity between individual 
stores (though being careful not to sacrifice the im-
pression of being inviting and moreover localized),1 
Starbucks thus falls from a particularized distinct-
iveness and fulfils Casey’s definition of site as 
“having no internal differentiations with respect to 
material constitution” and so “leveled down to the 
point of being definable solely in terms of distances 
between ‘positions’ which are established on its sur-
face and which exist strictly in relation to one an-
other” (1987a, p. 185). 
It is not “distinct potencies” that individuates 
one Starbucks from another but rather the geometri-
cal space that exists between them. That they are 
often confused with one another only emphasizes 
their essential vacuity and so reinforces their pres-
ence, not as a place, but as a site. 
 
***** 
tarbucks exemplifies a location that outwardly 
reveals a lack of identity and so conforms to the 
category of site. Negative qualities associated with 
Starbucks are invariably bound to its apparent indif-
ference as to what it contains at any given moment. 
“To be in place is to be sheltered and sustained by 
its containing boundary” (p. 186), writes Casey. 
In Starbucks, shelter appears prima facie dis-
counted by the absence of particular containment. 
Instead, one becomes intuitively aware of a location 
that undergoes (and aspires to) the mere semblance 
of containment. 
In turn, this sense of ‘obligated inclusion’ is 
likely to have the opposite effect—i.e., to invoke 
repulsion. Nevertheless, there is a risk that this out-
right dichotomy between repulsion and attraction 
will harvest a partial perspective. As a result, the 
possibility of the site being both memorable and 
intimate is apparently lost. 
Arguably, the resistance against regarding a site 
as being memorable owes its origin to the myth of 
Simonides. According to Yates’ account, a memora-
ble place tends to be both varied and sequentially 
related. Arranging a ‘loci’ in a defined order, says 
Yates (1966, pp. 22-23), enables memory to be re-
trieved with greater ease. 
Inversely, a lack of spatial variation is likely to 
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very little is remembered, and disorientation is 
gained as one dead end meets another. Further, a 
place that fails to house obvious distinctions will 
lose sequentiality and instead promote uniformity. 
That uniformity lessens the potential for memo-
rability is logical insofar as memorable place relies 
on “distinct potencies” to preserve memory. A mul-
tiplicity of diverse attributes might well furnish a 
place with the means to house memory. Bachelard 
(1964, p. 8) writes: “if the house is a bit elaborate… 
our memories have refuges that are all the more 
clearly delineated.” 
This does not entail, however, that an indistinct 
location is unmemorable and so devoid of intimacy. 
On the contrary: what it implies is that memorabil-
ity relies not on “distinct potencies” determined by 
the natural unfolding of lived experience but rather 
by the cultivated and essentially contrived appear-
ance of lived experience. 
Thus, distinct particularization suffers a loss of 
actuality and instead is replaced by standardization 
and a sense of either implied or otherwise unlived 
experience. In turn, it is the cultivation itself, being 
essentially vacuous, which provides a platform for 
new memories to be conceived. Accordingly, the 
object of cultivation acquires a depth despite its ap-
parent lack of intended temporal depth. In effect, it 
is a meta-depth. 
 
***** 
henomenologically, this affirmation of the site’s 
potential for intimacy needs to be distinguished 
from what might be called a post-modern ironiza-
tion of site. A kitsch interaction with a location, 
confining itself to a celebration of surface appraisal 
alone, fails to countenance the possibility of that 
location’s becoming anything more than mere di-
version. Against the threat of a supposedly insipid 
form, kitsch appears to disarm standardization by 
ironically affirming it. 
Hence: that which threatens to supplant the par-
ticularity of place is willed to emerge preemptively. 
As such, it is a pernicious strategy that evinces a 
passive form of aggressive resistance against site in 
the hope that the ‘siteness’ of the site will be over-
thrown by an ironic domestication of it.2 
The idea that site is limited by a homogenous 
lack of depth might well explain the inherent nega-
tivity that is often conferred upon it. Part of the re-
sistance felt by those who refuse to frequent Star-
bucks often involves the belief that it strives to the 
status of a traditional (where traditional usually 
means ‘bohemian’) coffee house but instead 
emerges as a sterilized artifice. The employment of 
implicitly organic features such as ethnic art, earthly 
colors, recycled napkins, and dark laminated floor-
boards, rather than mirror the earthly origins of the 
coffee bean, only emphasizes this tension between 
particularity and mass-produced affectation. 
Even if this claim is correct—and its validity is 
largely extraneous here—then the standardization of 
a place does not serve to undermine the memories 
that evade that homogeny. As Casey (1987, p. 190) 
suggests, “it is just one more lot to look at, and a 
such it is distinctly unmemorable.”A site that ob-
tains meta-depth instead subverts the lack of tempo-
ral depth originally provoked by artificial features 
by rendering those features temporal in themselves.  
 
***** 
entral to both Bachelard and Casey is the no-
tion that the particularity of place is instrumen-
tal in developing, in Casey’s terms (1987a, p. 186) 
“points of attachment” or, in Bachelard’s terms 
(1964, p. 8), “countless alveoli” that allow memory 
to be contained and so retrieved. 
For Casey, variegations and obtrusions on the 
landscape define it in a positive fashion. Through 
encountering them, we are said to be “slowed down, 
stopped, or in some other way caught-in-place” 
(1987a, p. 198). Becoming attentive to place is 
brought about by a distinction between background 
and foreground. 
This is equally true of ‘accidental’ obtrusions. In 
the shopping mall, we are likely to remember the 
disabled elevator because it caused us inconven-
ience through thwarting our progress. What impli-
cates an object being memorable is the context in 
which it finds itself. The elevator individuates itself 
from the background through countering the move-
ment of the shopping mall. 
This dynamic that allows an object to become 
memorable through obtruding the landscape is fore-
shadowed in Heidegger’s analysis of the everyday 
tool. For Heidegger, everyday usage with things de-
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long as things remain in use, they remain undiscov-
ered: “A totality of useful things is always already 
discovered before the individual useful thing” (Hei-
degger, 1996, p. 64). The everyday world of things 
conceals itself within in a complex relationship be-
tween the assignment of usability and the produc-
tion of that usability. 
 
***** 
hus, a thing is ‘conspicuous’ when it has sub-
verted the “associations in which we use it” and 
instead disclosed itself “in a certain unhandiness” 
(p. 68). This subversion manifests primarily itself in 
the damage or absence of that thing. On the one 
hand, a damaged thing withdraws from use and so 
forces us to consider its unhandiness. As a result of 
this unhandiness, ‘objective presence’ paradoxically 
makes itself known. On the other hand, the absence 
of things causes us to be heedful to the space in 
which that thing was to be placed. Moreover, the 
greater that thing is sought, then the more objec-
tively present it becomes “such that it seems to lose 
the character of handiness” (p. 69). 
Through being removed from a given context, a 
presence is created in the space of absence which in 
turn constitutes an obtrusion. This is a significant 
point that highlights a basic shortcoming of Casey’s 
account of content-dominated variegation. Whereas 
Casey speaks of variegation in terms of an obtruded 
presence (consummately, the “erection of a distinc-
tive house upon…an indifferent building lot” 
[1987a, p. 186]), Heidegger’s analysis demonstrates 
that diversity and disruption are also characterized 
by negation and absence too. 
Not only does the absence constitute a “breach 
in the context of references” (1996, p. 70), but it 
also disrupts the pre-mediated totality of things, so 
far conditioned by handiness: “But with this total-
ity,” Heidegger (1996, p. 70) writes, “world makes 
itself known.” Transferring this totality to the ap-
parent conflict between place and site, it is evident 
that points of attachment need not involve a logic of 
content and presence. 
Often, being slowed down or otherwise becom-
ing attentive to our surroundings manifests in terms 
of what is missing from that landscape. Thus, in the 
space of the site, it is the very ‘leveling down’ of 
variegation that constitutes a presence in its own 
right. This inversion of variegations is realized in 
that sites produce not convex ‘points of attachment’ 
but, rather, entirely concave geometrical hollows. 
 
***** 
f site is universal by dint of lacking particular 
content and so indifferent to us, then when that 
site is rendered intimate, an ambiguity between 
these divisions is the necessary result. Thus, until it 
is imbued with lived experience, site remains out-
side us, homogenous, universal and for Casey 
(1987a, p. 190) “even inimical.” 
Yet, in the experience of conferring a meta-
depth upon the site, a tension is created between 
subjective experience and the objective status of 
that site. Site and place appear to have converged, 
yet the convergence is vague because site remains 
as site while place maintains its distance. 
Unlike place, memory does not therefore remain 
fixed definitely as “fossilized duration concretized” 
(Bachelard, 1964, p. 8). Rather, it shifts in between 
states of clarity. Moreover, since site itself is framed 
by a lack of particular distinction, experience which 
took place in site is never definite. This is realized 
in that site is not, in Casey’s words, a place-holder 
for memories. Instead, memory resides dynami-
cally—the relationship between the contained and 
the container prone to mutability, not rigidity.  
Transposing Bachelard’s topoanalytic investiga-
tion of the house onto the site, we would therefore 
be required to be just as heedful to detail. Since 
sites are easily confused, the nuances that individu-
ate one site from another do so resonantly. Marginal 
details, hitherto dismissed, assume a significance 
that is realized in their immediate but otherworldly 
intimacy. If it is a specific parking lot we remember 
but find ourselves in a different city, even in a dif-
ferent country, then we are likely to notice precisely 
what renders one lot different from the other. 
The individuation is subtle, but because of that 
subtlety the difference is experienced more force-
fully. In the wide expanse of empty site, universality 
and particularity thus compound. In doing so, mem-
ory, not only assumed to have existed by means of 
affectation or physical ornament, is emplaced in a 
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***** 
n this essay, I have sought to demonstrate that 
place need not hold a monopoly on memorability 
and that, through resisting place’s ‘points of attach-
ment’, site instead creates an inverted hollow that is 
able to contain memory. In turn, this renders site 




That this vagueness might constitute a more ac-
curate representation of the past, being essentially 
fragmented rather than complete, is a question that 
begets further speculation. Nonetheless, as the ur-
ban landscape beckons to become ever more ho-
mogenized, resistance against this change opens 
itself to the dangers of a nostalgic idealization of 
static place. If site, in its unflinching ambiguity, can 
evoke a non-fixed image of space, then it will have 
already proved its power through contesting the 




1. That local art is hung on the otherwise identical 
walls means that each Starbucks can vary suffi-
ciently to warrant being distinct without wholly 
subverting the recognized formula. The presence of 
localized attributes (a Starbucks in Brighton Beach, 
Brooklyn, has Russian menus and chess tables to 
accommodate the large Russian community) has the 
effect of generating the impression of Starbucks be-
ing a place rather than a site. As the official website 
confesses: “Welcome! A Starbucks coffee shop is a 
special place. But most of all, it’s your place.”  I 2. Furthermore, while site and ‘non-place’ (particu-larity Marc Augé’s treatment [1995] of non-place) 
share obvious similarities in their lack of temporal 
depth, their distinction ought to be maintained. 
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irst came the place. After searching for land 
on which to build my dream home, I finally 
found a property of 20 acres that was just 
right. Heavily wooded, subtended by a granite shelf 
laced with veins of quartz crystal, a portion of a 
much larger hardwood forest, my site included the 
requisite swiftly flowing river and a meandering, 
spring-fed stream punctuated by waterfalls.  
It was not, however, the “parts” that compelled 
the conclusion that this was the spot, for the “parts” 
never do quite make up the “whole.” Rather, I think 
it was the way the rolling hills palpably undulated 
the first time I walked this land that persuaded me 
this was my spot. Validating that conclusion was an 
old Indian marker tree—a large oak that, in its 
youth, had been deliberately bent horizontal and 
then again vertical. Yes, this was a powerful place. 
But building the house would wait an unexpect-
edly long time and afford many decisions and revi-
sions. First, where to build? With so much beautiful 
land, I could choose from several sites. One had 
early on caught my fancy on the far edge of the 
third ridge in, near the Indian marker tree, with a 
270 degree panorama of the river valley 200 feet 
below. 
As I came nearer to building, however, I real-
ized the small stream would need to be dammed so 
that a driveway could traverse the first ridge nearest 
the road. But imagining the small lake the dam 
would make, I now became interested in an alterna-
tive building site: the second ridge overlooking the 
lake. This site was only an acre but would nestle 
between tall trees on either hillside while opening 
up a vista of sky in the otherwise thick forest. 
 Now there was a dilemma—really, the basic 
existential dilemma of our embodied finitude. Shall 
I live here, in this life? Or there, in that one? Two 
possible futures, and the responsibility of choosing 
one. But which one? We know our lives will be dif-
ferent depending on which fork we take on the path, 
but we cannot know beforehand the difference. So 
we are “condemned to choose” precisely when we 
do not know what we want. As the Greeks long ago 
recognized, we remain in this “all too human” trap 
as long as we are ignorant of who we really are. 
Instead of choosing blindly, I did what I learned 
to do in such situations: wait and see. I would ask 
many others, “Which would you choose?” They 
would tell me, “This one” or “That one” without 
really convincing me. 
Then, one day, a wise old Cajun walked the land 
with me. When I asked him, “Where?” he replied, 
not by picking one site or the other, but by noting: 
“If you choose the higher ridge, you will build the 
home for your outward looking self. If you choose 
the ridge beside the future lake, you will build the 
home for your inward looking self.” 
At that moment, I could see both “selves” 
clearly, and these “sites of vision” forcefully clari-
fied who I was. I also saw myself in a developmen-
tal perspective: I had lived forty years mostly culti-
vating my “outward looking self.” It was time, di-
vorced and at mid-life, to devote the next stage to 
nurturing my “inward looking self.” It was time for 
this inward turn, time to sit by the lake. I would not 
lose the ridge top view. It would be the spot to 
which I would walk to have my breath taken away, 
savoring that place precisely because it would not 











Seeing My Site 
When it came time to build, a further “siting” had to 
be made. Now it became imperative to set the veri-
table stakes into the ground: to actually demarcate 
the “footprint” of the house on the land. More 
choosing! Should the house sit higher up the ridge, 
or farther toward the tip end? And exactly what an-
gle would the house have toward the little lake, it-
self still only a figment of the imagination?  
How to know? By an act of “emplacing” myself 
into the “virtual house”–and seeing how it felt to be 
“there.” How does the land beneath this spot feel? 
How do the trees surround this one? Where is the 
sun? The wind? The sound of the stream, running 
over the rocks? Husserl described the task of phe-
nomenological analysis as requiring acts of “empa-
thy” with imaginal, or virtual experiences, and this 
is what I attempted. I employed the skills I had 
learned as a phenomenologist to “find” where my 
house was by virtually inhabiting it. 
 But it wasn’t only the house that had to be 
sited. Next came the driveway. It was “raw” land 
after all—a hardwood forest that had been undis-
turbed for generations. The house was to be about 
800 feet in from the road, so cutting a driveway 
through the woods would be the first “gash” to this 
ecology. It felt analogous to the strange sense of 
violation that must have accompanied the first sur-
gical incision. 
The challenge was to find a path so closely fol-
lowing the contours of the land it would be at home 
there and not washed away by the natural forces of 
erosion that otherwise would tend to close that de-
hiscence, much as the body heals its own wounds. 
Again, this task was greatly aided by an “empathic 
immersion” in the roll of the land coursing, like wa-
ter, over its swells and around the large trees. 
A particular challenge was the gap between the 
first ridge, nearer the road, and the second ridge, on 
which the house would be built. The drop and rise 
in elevation was too much for a driveway, so the 
driveway’s lowest point would have to be built up. 
But a lovely small stream eddied its way along 
the floor of this small valley. So, to bridge these two 
ridges would require an earthen dam spanning them, 
and the stream would be backed up to form a lake. 
Of course, the tall old oaks along either side of that 
streambed would have to be cut down—trees and a 
lake just cannot co-inhabit the same spot. While I 
had found a way to wind the course of my driveway 
around the tall trees, sparing every one, here there 
could be no compromise: these trees would have to 
die, for the sake of my house. 
It was shocking to watch two men with chain-
saws and bulldozer massacre the trees in one day. 
The slaughter was horrific and, at day’s end, with 
the beginning of an earthen dam starting to back up 
muddy water over the site of devastation, I felt 
heartrendingly sad. All I could do was to take re-
sponsibility for what I had done, by sitting with the 
felled trees, being with them as they died. I could 
feel their suffering as twilight settled around us. 
And then the lesson. It was the frogs who taught 
me. They quickly found this expanding pool of new 
water, and arrived by the dozens, maybe the hun-
dreds, and began to sing, to celebrate the appear-
ance of this new watery wonderland! And here, be-
fore my eyes, was the old lesson of Shiva: that de-
struction and creation were two halves of the same 
wheel, always turning upon itself. Living in the for-
est since then has given me innumerable instances 
of this profound truth. 
 
Building My Home 
I had an overall design idea in mind. Indeed, it had 
been “in my mind” long before I had even seen the 
land. I had long dreamed of a house that would be a 
Victorian style—a real “painted lady” with lots of 
gingerbread trim, turrets and towers and such. But 
now, facing my spot here in my woods, I realized 
quite definitively that this dream house was not the 
house that this spot called for. Such a house would 
be an interloper never at home. 
I began all over again, asking this place what 
sort of house would be “at home.” I did my best to 
empty my mind to see what might belong. Slowly at 
first, then faster, a house came into view—with un-
painted, cypress siding that would weather naturally 
from golden brown to the soft grey of the surround-
ing trees, until the building would so blend into its 
surround that one would have to almost run into the 
house before seeing it. 
And lots of windows, large ones, with no divid-
ers. French style and pivoting open to give untram-
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meled views of the woods. Ceilings a little higher 
than usual, to give airiness and space, within the 
vaulting trees outside. A two-story house that would 
provide the most area for the smallest footprint, nes-
tling midst the trees without dominating them. The 
surrounding oaks would encompass the house, em-
bracing and including it within their world. 
It would be essential that as few as possible be 
cut. With great care, we saved several large ones 
within a few feet of the house. Most builders would 
have said, “Take them out, they’re just going to die 
anyway.” Treated with care, however, they didn’t. 
There was one, particularly near the house, a 
lovely double trunked old white oak. Almost every-
one said it would die and should be cut down. 
Deeply torn, I asked one very old local what he 
thought. After standing silently before it for a few 
minutes, he replied, “It’s got a long and deep tap 
root. It’ll be fine.” I kept it. He was right. 
As for the design of the house itself, I again did 
my best to proceed phenomenologically. I placed 
myself within my imagined house, and anticipated 
how each room would unfold around me, how it 
would “feel” to be “there.” These repeated acts of 
“experiential imagining” brought forward the house 
in its virtuality, and it was with this “virtual house” 
that I worked to refine and clarify its design. 
For example, wanting the house to be as intrin-
sically connected with its place as possible, I was 
sensitive to the essence of “layers” and gradations 
between “inside” and “outside.” I pictured a porch 
wrapping around the front and an upstairs balcony, 
both of which were “outside layers of the inside.” 
Next, on one side, a sun room—a warm, enclosed 
space with walls of windows on three sides and 
filled with plants. With a floor of rougher wood, this 
room would be filled with wicker furniture and help 
shape the “inside layer of the outside.” 
In short, there was to be no sharp dualism be-
tween inside and outside but, rather, a continuum of 
interconnectedness even manifested by the front 
door, which, already set back within the front porch, 
marked the transition between the “inside layer of 
the outside” and the “outside layer of the inside.” A 
solid oak door but with a long centered oval glass 
and long, narrow flanking transom windows. 
 
Spaces Within 
Next, the interiority itself. The front door opened 
onto a foyer, a small square area to provide a further 
transition between inside and outside but now on 
the “inside of the inside.” Bordered by a coat closet 
on one side and a small bathroom on the other, this 
foyer faced a center oak staircase that was like a 
waterfall of wood, flowing up and down, inward 
and outward. Atop the stairs was a landing, framed 
by a large window, through which the sun and trees 
streamed in. The stairs led up to the trees which, 
welcomed in, flowed down. 
I wanted each area of the house to have its own 
distinct atmosphere and each room to be its own 
“lived world” of experience. In addition to making 
separate rooms (rather than the now common “great 
room”) I was determined to amplify these distinc-
tive atmospheres by the use of color. The foyer, 
staircase walls, and central upstairs room would be 
a salmon, which invited movement into its space 
and opened with ease onto the other atmospheres. 
To the right of the foyer, through an open dou-
ble doorway, would be the dining room, a place to 
gather for spirited feasting and conversations, for 
family life, romantic intimacies and friendships. For 
its walls, I envisioned a dark red, softened and 
warmed by a hint of brown. And trimmed in white 
to evoke a depth that, particularly in candle light, 
would give the room a dimensionality, of latencies 
emergently subtending the manifest. 
Off the side of the dining room, a narrow door-
way would lead to the kitchen. Most kitchens strike 
me as oppressive “work stations” where one is sur-
rounded by equipment and storage facilities. One 
too often feels trapped in a kitchen, and I wanted 
exactly the opposite. My kitchen, facing south, 
would open to the rolling land that undulated its 
way up the long ridge. 
To fashion this view, I wanted twelve-foot-wide 
windows across the wall but where, then, could 
cupboards be placed? The solution was to break the 
kitchen into four sub-areas. An interior side, open-
ing to the dining room, would become the “dish 
pantry,” lined on both sides by cupboards and cabi-
nets, sink and dishwasher. 
An exterior side would serve for “food prep,” 
accommodating a long counter top beneath the win-
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dows, plus a range and second sink, both at the level 
of the counter, which would be anchored at one end 
by a food pantry and at the other by a cabinet en-
closing the refrigerator. Here, Heidegger’s “readi-
ness to hand” served my planning, and I arranged 
for implements and ingredients to be right where 
my hands would most easily find them. 
I envisioned a third sub-area of the kitchen 
tucked beneath the descending ceiling of the stair-
case and containing laundry machines, linked via 
laundry chute to upstairs. Last was a small sitting 
space with desktop and cookbook shelf. 
Extending out from the west side of the house 
would be the sun room, with three sides of windows 
and linked to the woods beyond. During the half 
year from May through October, the forest would 
shelter this room from the hot sun but, during the 
other half of the year, this room would receive the 
sun’s warmth and invite sunsets into the house. 
On the opposite east side of the house would be 
the study. Located at the end of the hallway off the 
front foyer, this space would be distantiated from 
the rest of the house—a retreat and place of con-
templation. I envisioned, upon entering, a nook to 
the left—a wall alcove with a raised platform of 
cushions and pillows, long and wide enough to re-
cline and read. Beyond the alcove, one would enter 
the main space, which is centered by a large stone 
fireplace. The study is drenched in dark green and 
rimmed by the dark wood of floor-to-ceiling book-
cases built into the walls. 
Though primarily an inward-leaning space, the 
study would have a large desk looking out a south 
facing window, allowing flights of fancy to the 
world beyond. Behind the desk is a window seat for 
an east-facing window from which, during times of 
quiet reflection, I might watch the moon rise, then, 
through the other window over the desk, watch the 
moon move as it marks the passage of time. 
 
Going Up 
I have always preferred a two-story house to con-
cretize the experience of going to a different level in 
our nocturnal dreamscapes. The staircase in my 
house leads upstairs to a center room from which, 
set back by little alcoves, all the other upstairs 
rooms radiate. This central space is designed to be a 
“family room” connecting the private rooms of all 
the members of the house. It is the “game room” 
where we come together to play. 
The east upstairs wing includes the bedrooms 
for my two children, both of whom participated in 
the design (following appropriate instruction from 
me on how to phenomenologically “emplace” them-
selves “in” their virtual room). 
In imagining his room, my son, then six years 
old, included a fireplace and a “secret doorway” 
disguised as a bookcase opening on a passageway to 
a secret room in the attic. He chose a bright shade of 
green for his walls, much like the color of the new 
leaves of the forest trees in early spring. 
My daughter, then eleven, designed her room as 
a suite of two spaces: an “outer” or “public” room 
open to the house beyond, and an “inner” or “pri-
vate” room, itself accessible only through the outer 
room. In her “public” room she set up her study, 
with built-in bookcases (one of which opened onto 
the secret passage). Her inner room included a wall 
alcove with a platform for her waterbed. This space 
was also a dressing room and play room—the place 
where she kept the toys and the doll house she and I 
had made when she was much younger. If her study 
was the place of her telos, this room was the place 
of her arche. She painted her study lavender, while 
she painted the inner room bright pink, her favorite 
color when she was very young. 
On the western wing upstairs was my bedroom, 
which I designed to be infused by the image of a 
favorite enclosure of my childhood—a tree house. 
High off the ground, this space incorporates large 
windows on three sides opening to the nearby tree 
branches. I wanted to feel amidst the trees, includ-
ing the old white oak saved from cutting when the 
site was first prepared. I arched the shape of the 
ceiling so the patter of rain would be directly over-
head. The front of the room opened onto a balcony, 
itself hidden into the roof of the front porch below. 
On the balcony sits a hot tub—a place for relaxation 
beneath the stars. Both the bedroom and the balcony 
face the setting sun and moon. 
  
Elegant, Rustic, & Whimsical 
Through this project of designing and building my 
dream home, I realized that there was so much more 
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than making a structure that would be safe and effi-
cient. More even than an intelligent design. By 
imaginally placing myself as intensively as I could 
into the experience of living in the house I was 
building, I found the house that was to be my home. 
In hindsight, I can see that there were three essential 
yet implicit constituents of the experience I was 
seeking to incarnate: I wanted my home to embody 
a sense of elegant, rustic whimsicality. It had to be 
beautiful, at ease, and playful. 
While this essential structure of the “experi-
enced home” remained implicit during its building, 
by being as conscious as possible of how the design 
opened a lived experience, I was able to be guided 
by that virtual experience, so that the imagined 
house emerged as a particular and personal experi-
ential reality, a dream home of one’s own. 
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nature. More than any other, it was this 
book that guided me. 
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